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Abstract	(Max	150	words)	
	Turkey	has	long	been	enjoying	high	growth	rates	with	the	support	of	speculative	financial	flows	and	a	boom	in	the	construction	industry.	However,	the	Turkish	economy	at	the	same	time	was	step-by-step	becoming	more	fragile	during	the	recent	years.	The	diplomatic	crisis	between	the	US	 and	 Turkey	 gave	 a	 push	 to	 the	 economic	 downturn	 in	 Turkey	 that	 was	 already	 coming.	Indeed,	the	Turkish	Lira	already	depreciated	by	more	than	20%	against	USD	in	2018	before	the	diplomatic	tension	peaked.	The	depreciation	in	the	Turkish	Lira	against	USD	for	2018	was	41%	at	the	date	that	this	article	was	written.	
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The	End	of	Boom	and	the	Political	Economy	of	Turkey’s	crisis	
	“If	 they	 have	 their	 dollars,	 we	 have	 people,	 our	 God”…	 This	 was	 Tayyip	 Erdoğan’s	 response	following	Donald	Trump’s	sanctions	and	new	tariffs	on	Turkey,	which	triggered	the	collapse	of	the	Turkish	 Lira.	 Erdoğan	 also	 says	 “the	attack	on	economy	 is	 the	same	as	the	attack	on	call	 to	
prayer	and	our	flag”	in	a	more	recent	speech.		The	 voting	 behaviour	 in	 Turkey	 is	 strongly	 connected	 to	 the	 economic	 perceptions;	however,	Erdoğan’s	popularity	also	rises	at	 specific	moments	 (such	as	 the	 failed	military	coup	attempt	in	2016	or	Turkey’s	military	operation	in	Afrin)	in	which	nationalism	peaks	up.	For	this	reason,	 Erdoğan	 aims	 to	 manipulate	 the	 public	 audience	 in	 Turkey	 by	 framing	 the	 incoming	“economic	crisis”	as	an	“economic	war”	or	even	an	“economic	jihad”.	Donald	Trump’s	sanctions	and	new	 tariffs	on	Turkey,	which	come	as	a	 form	of	punishing	Turkey	 for	 the	detention	of	US	Evangelical	Pastor	Brunson,	provided	Erdoğan	a	scapegoat	 for	 the	economic	crisis	and	also	an	opportunity	to	distract	Turkish	people’s	focus	on	economy	through	boosting	nationalism.	Nevertheless,	the	reality	is	very	different	than	the	way	Erdoğan	frames	it.	Turkey	has	long	been	enjoying	high	growth	rates	with	the	support	of	speculative	 financial	 flows	and	a	boom	in	the	 construction	 industry.	 However,	 the	 Turkish	 economy	 at	 the	 same	 time	was	 step-by-step	becoming	more	fragile	during	the	recent	years.	The	diplomatic	crisis	between	the	US	and	Turkey	gave	a	push	to	the	economic	downturn	in	Turkey	that	was	already	coming.	Indeed,	the	Turkish	Lira	already	depreciated	by	more	than	20%	against	USD	in	2018	before	the	diplomatic	tension	peaked.	The	depreciation	in	the	Turkish	Lira	against	USD	for	2018	was	41%	at	the	date	that	this	article	was	written.		Briefly,	three	points	are	crucial	for	understanding	the	downturn	in	Turkey:	1)	 Turkey	 has	 been	 experiencing	 chronic	 current	 account	 deficit	 problem	 in	 2000s.	 Turkey’s	current	account	deficit/GDP	ratio	was	5.6%	in	2017	and	6.7%	during	the	first	quarter	of	2018.		2)	The	gross	external	debt	as	a	 share	of	GDP	 (%)	 in	Turkey	 increased	 from	36.7%	 in	2011	 to	52.9%	in	the	first	quarter	of	2018.	The	increase	is	mainly	driven	by	the	external	indebtedness	of	the	private	sector.	3)	 The	 gross	 foreign	 currency	 reserves	 of	 the	 Central	 Bank	 of	 the	Republic	 of	 Turkey	 (CBRT)	depleted	from	$112.0	billion	in	December	2013	to	$78,3	billion	in	July	2018	and	to	$70,4	billion	in	August	2018,	while	Turkey’s	foreign	currency	needs	are	rising.		
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Turkey’s	chronic	current	account	balance	problem	Turkey	has	historically	been	an	economy	that	grew	by	giving	current	account	deficits.	However,	the	current	account	deficit	in	Turkey	has	been	particularly	high	in	the	post-2002	period.	During	2010-2017,	the	current	account	deficit	as	a	share	of	GDP	(%)	was	on	average	5.6%,	which	is	the	largest	amongst	OECD	and	G-20	countries.	At	times	of	boom,	the	investment-savings	gap	in	the	private	 sector	has	been	 the	main	 root	of	 the	current	account	deficit.	The	high	current	account	deficits	were	 possible	mainly	with	 the	 support	 of	 low	 interest	 rate/high	money	 supply	 in	 the	higher-income	countries	in	an	environment	in	which	the	regulations	on	capital	inflows	are	low1.		
		Imports	of	primary,	 intermediate	and	capital	goods	rather	than	imports	of	consumption	good	constitute	the	vast	majority	of	imports	in	Turkey.	In	other	words,	the	industrial	production	
																																																								1	Turkish	Statistical	 Institute	 (Turkstat)	 revised	 its	national	 account	 calculations	 in	2015.	According	 to	Turkstat’s	previous	GDP	series,	 the	average	GDP	growth	rate	 for	2010-2015	was	5.2%.	This	average	 increased	to	7.3%	with	Turkstat’s	 revisions	 on	 GDP	 calculations.	 Turkstat’s	 revisions	 also	 changed	 the	 sectoral	 shares,	 investment	 and	savings	 rates	 in	 the	 national	 accounts	 calculations.	 However,	 Turkstat’s	 GDP	 revisions	 are	 subject	 to	 serious	criticisms.	 	 Inconsistencies	 between	GDP	 series,	 and	data	 on	production	 in	manufacturing	 industry,	 employment,	electricity	use,	 construction	 inputs	were	noted	by	a	number	of	 economists.	 For	 this	policy	brief,	 I	 use	 the	official	statistics	by	reserving	the	criticisms	on	the	data,	since	an	alternative	dataset	is	not	available.		
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Figure	1:	GDP	growth;	current	account	deSicit	and	private	investment-private	
savings	gap	in	Turkey		as	a	share	of	GDP	(%)		
Source:	WDI	(2018)	and	author's	calculations	based	on	Republic	of	Turkey	Ministry	of	Development	(2018)	Note:	GDP	growth	(%)	for	2018	Q1	is	growth	compared	to	the	rirst	quarter	in	2017	
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is	strongly	dependent	on	import	goods.	Therefore,	high	growth	is	associated	with	rapidly	rising	current	account	deficit	in	this	period	(Figure	1).		However,	 the	 large	 share	 of	 investments	 (relative	 to	 savings)	 have	 not	 yet	 led	 to	 a	structural	 technological	 change	 in	 industry	 that	 would	 reduce	 the	 current	 account	 deficit	problem.	The	Erdoğan	government	also	did	not	develop	efficient	 industrial	policies	that	would	increase	 the	 domestic	 value	 added	 of	 industrial	 products.	 The	 Erdoğan	 government	 rather	followed	an	easier	path	and	implemented	policies	that	would	boost	growth	through	construction	projects.	 Especially	 after	 2009,	 the	 Erdoğan	 government	 consistently	 supported	 the	 housing	investments	through	a	new	urban	development	law	in	2012,	and	public	housing	investments	of	Mass	 Housing	 Administration.	 Moreover,	 the	 capital	 in	 Turkey	 was	 directed	 to	 massive	infrastructure	projects	such	as	the	$10.2	billion	worth	new	airport	in	Istanbul	built	and	will	be	operated	by	a	consortium	of	five	Turkish	contractors.	As	a	result,	the	composition	of	investments	shifted	 from	 industry	 to	 construction	 as	 in	 Figure	 2.	 Between	 2005	 and	 2016,	 the	 share	 of	manufacturing	 in	 investments	 declined	 from	 27.6%	 to	 18.1%,	 while	 the	 share	 of	 housing	increased	by	9.5	percentage	points.			
	With	the	new	composition	of	investments,	unsurprisingly,	the	construction	sector’s	share	in	GDP	increased	from	4.5%	in	2003	to	8.6%	in	2017.	Nevertheless,	the	boom	also	now	left	the	
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Figure	2:	Share	of	selected	sectors	in	total	(private	&	public)	investments	in	
Turkey	(%)			
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construction	 sector	 in	Turkey	highly	 indebted	at	 a	period	 in	which	 the	 stock	of	unsold	homes	peaked.	The	construction	firms	that	are	mainly	 indebted	in	foreign	currency	already	started	to	declare	bankruptcies	and	requested	debt	restructuring.		
Why	is	Turkey	facing	the	economic	downturn	‘now’?	Considering	 Turkey’s	 high	 current	 account	 deficits	 between	 2003-2017,	 the	 more	 interesting	question	is	‘how	did	Turkey	not	experience	a	debt	crisis	until	now’	as	opposed	to	‘why	Turkey	is	experiencing	 an	 economic	downturn’.	 	We	 can	understand	 this	 by	dividing	 the	 story	 into	 four	periods.		
1)	Years	of	growth,	FDI	and	privatisations	(2003-2008	3Q)	During	 the	 first	period	 from	2003	 to	 the	 third	quarter	of	2008,	Turkey	attracted	high	Foreign	Direct	 Investment	 (FDI)	 and	ended	by	 financing	almost	 a	half	 of	 its	 current	 account	deficit	 by	FDIs.	Total	net	FDI	inflows/Total	current	account	deficit	was	48.1%	in	this	period,	as	in	Figure	3,	which	 shows	 the	 ratios	 between	 total	 Foreign	 Direct	 Investment	 and	 total	 Foreign	 Portfolio	Investment	to	total	current	account	deficit	in	the	given	periods.		
	
0.00	
5.00	
10.00	
15.00	
20.00	
25.00	
30.00	
35.00	
40.00	
45.00	
50.00	
2003-2008	Q3	 2010-2013	 2013-2018	Q2	
Figure	3:	FPI	and	FDI	as	a	share	of	total	current	account	deSicit	in	
Turkey	(%)	for	the	given	periods	
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Nevertheless,	 the	 flow	of	 FDI’s	was	not	 entirely	 sustainable	 as	 a	 significant	part	 of	 this	was	 privatisations	 of	 public	 firms	 and	 acquisitions	 of	 other	 Turkish	 firms,	 rather	 than	 new	physical	investments.	Lebanese	firm	Oger’s	purchase	of	Turkish	Telecom	for	6.5	billion	dollars	in	2005,	Russian-Kazakh	firm	TransCentral	Asia	Petrochemical’s	purchase	of	oil	refinery-	PETKIM	for	 2.1	 billion	 dollars	 in	 2007;	 British	 American	 Tobacco’s	 purchase	 of	 Turkish	 tobacco	 firm-	TEKEL	for	1.7	billion	dollars	in	2008	are	examples	of	these	‘FDI’s	in	the	form	of	privatizations.		Moreover,	 18.1%	 of	 current	 account	 deficit	 was	 covered	 by	 Financial	 Portfolio	Investments	(FPI)	during	this	period.	High	money	supply	boosted	by	lower	interest	rates	in	the	US	and	the	relatively	lax	capital	account	regulations	in	Turkey	played	an	important	role	on	these	capital	 inflows.	 	 The	 high	 growth	 rates	 supported	 by	 FDIs	 and	 FPIs	 also	 boosted	 Tayyip	Erdoğan’s	popularity	as	Erdoğan’s	Justice	and	Development	Party	(AKP)	increased	its	votes	from	34.3%	in	November	2002	to	46.6%	July	2007.		
2)	The	Global	Crisis	and	Turkey’s	downturn	(2008	Q4	-2009)	During	the	period	of	global	crisis	(2008	Q4-2009),	the	net	financial	portfolio	inflows	stopped	and	turned	negative.	Moreover,	Foreign	Direct	Investments	are	reduced	by	59.4%	in	2009.	Due	to	the	large	 gap	 between	 private	 investments	 and	 savings,	 the	 significant	 decline	 in	 capital	 inflows	availability	 also	 significantly	 reduced	 the	 investments	 during	 the	 global	 crisis	 of	 2008.	 As	 a	result,	 Turkey	 experienced	 a	 negative	 growth	 rate	 of	 -4.7%,	which	 is	 lower	 than	most	 of	 the	other	emerging	economies.	However,	 the	recovery	started	by	the	end	of	2009	with	the	help	of	expansionary	 fiscal	and	monetary	policies	of	 the	Erdoğan	government	and	the	Central	Bank	of	the	Republic	of	Turkey.		
3)	Years	of	quantitative	easing,	capital	availability	and	financial	inflows	(2010	–	2013)	2010-2013	are	 the	years	of	FED’s	quantitative	easing,	 low	 interest	rates	 throughout	 the	world	and	capital	flows	to	emerging	market	economies.	 	During	this	period,	Turkey	continued	to	give	current	account	deficits,	which	are	on	average	6.7%	of	GDP.	44.8%	of	this	current	account	deficit	was	possible	through	Financial	Portfolio	Investments	that	global	economic	conditions	provided.	Net	FDI	was	limited,	only	covering	18.3%	of	current	account	deficit.	Hence,	according	to	official	statistics,	Turkey	experienced	a	very	high	average	growth	rate	of	8.2%,	which	was	 fragile	and	strongly	dependent	on	the	inflows	of	Financial	Portfolio	Investments.		
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4)	Accumulating	external	debts	and	depleting	foreign	currency	reserves	(2014	–	2018)	During	the	post-2014	period,	the	current	account	deficit	has	continued	to	be	high.	Nevertheless,	the	years	of	high	global	liquidity	in	the	world	were	over	with	the	end	of	quantitative	easing	and	FED’s	 policy	 of	 rising	 interest	 rates.	 Moreover,	 in	 this	 period,	 Turkey	 also	 had	 a	 series	 of	diplomatic	crises	with	the	US	and	EU	countries,	and	started	to	suffer	from	global	exclusion	at	a	global	 level	at	a	 time	when	 it	was	still	highly	dependent	on	 international	 financial	capital.	The	evident	 outcome	 is	 that	 Turkey	 did	 not	 receive	 FDIs,	 or	 FPIs	 sufficient	 enough	 to	 cover	 the	majority	of	its	current	account	deficits.		Under	these	conditions,	the	depreciation	of	Turkish	Lira	was	also	inevitable.	Central	Bank	of	 the	 Republic	 of	 Turkey	 tried	 to	 stop	 the	 currency	 attacks	 through	 supplying	 its	 foreign	currency	 reserves.	 However,	 unlike	 2003-2007	 and	 2009-2013,	 the	 CBRT’s	 foreign	 currency	reserves	declined	in	the	post-2014	period	and	indeed	Turkey’s	foreign	currency	reserves	were	used	for	financing	14.6%	of	the	current	account	deficit.	This	left	CBRT	with	limited	instruments	to	use	at	the	peak	of	Turkey’s	economic	downturn.			
		 In	 the	post-2014	period	keeping	 the	 investment-savings	gap	 in	private	 sector	has	been	possible	through	accumulating	external	debt	in	the	private	sector.	The	total	gross	external	debt	stock	as	a	share	of	GDP	during	this	period	 increased	from	41.2%	in	2013	to	52.9%	in	the	 first	
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Figure	4:	Gross	external	debt	stock	of	Turkey	as	a	share	of	GDP	(%)	
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Source:	Central	Bank	of	the	Republic	of	Turkey	(2018)	
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quarter	of	2018	(Figure	4).	The	recent	level	of	external	indebtedness	is	close	that	of	the	Turkey’s	debt	crisis	in	2001.	A	noticeable	rise	in	the	external	indebtedness	of	private	sector	was	in	2017,	in	which	Turkey	also	had	a	high	growth	 rate	of	7.4%	and	a	 current	account	deficit	of	5.6%	of	GDP.	The	overheating	in	this	period	was	possible	through	CBRT’s	low	interest	rate	policy,	which	is	 a	 result	 of	 Erdoğan’s	 pressure	 on	 CBRT	 to	 keep	 the	 interest	 rates	 low.	 Also	 the	 Erdoğan	government	boosted	the	credit	growth	through	a	 fund	called	Credit	Guarantee	Fund	(CGF).	 	 In	2017,	Credit	Guarantee	Fund	provided	collaterals	to	11.8%	of	commercial	credits	and	supported	the	boom	by	incentivizing	the	investments	of	small	and	medium	enterprises.				
What	 is	 next	 and	what	 are	 the	possible	 effects	 of	 the	 economic	downturn	on	 the	working	
classes?	The	 recent	 depreciation	 of	 the	 Turkish	 Lira	 left	 private	 companies	 in	 Turkey	 in	 a	 difficult	position	as	 their	debts	 in	USD	or/and	Euro	 increased	almost	by	21%	in	 terms	of	Turkish	Lira.	However,	the	most	significant	effects	of	the	depreciation	might	not	have	been	actualized	yet	as	the	 debt	 repayments	 of	 private	 companies	 were	 relatively	 low	 in	 August	 and	 larger	 share	 of	repayments	are	due	September	and	especially	October	2018.	Hence,	September	and	October	are	likely	 to	be	harder	months	 for	 the	Turkish	economy	and	 the	worst	of	 the	economic	downturn	might	yet	to	come.		The	previous	economic	crises	of	1994	and	2001	 in	Turkey	 led	 to	significant	declines	 in	the	wage	shares,	which	was	not	the	case	in	2008/09.	The	difference	between	two	is	likely	to	be	the	hyperinflation	in	1994	and	2001	and	relatively	low	consumer	inflation	rate	of	6.5%	in	2009.	The	downward	stickiness	of	nominal	wages	is	likely	to	reduce	the	damage	on	real	wages	at	the	time	of	an	economic	crisis;	however,	 the	nominal	wages	cannot	keep	up	with	 the	rising	prices	when	unemployment	 problem	 also	 becomes	 noticeable.	 The	 inflation	 for	 domestic	 production	goods	was	already	32.1%	for	August	2018.	With	the	recent	depreciation	of	the	Turkish	Lira	the	rise	 in	consumer	prices	 is	 likely	 to	exceed	25%,	which	also	would	damage	 the	real	wages	at	a	peak	of	a	crisis.		On	 top	 of	 this,	 all	 social	 movements	 including	 labour	 movements	 are	 under	 severe	pressure	under	the	highly	authoritarian	Erdoğan	rule.	Erdoğan	government	already	developed	a	questionable	habit	of	banning	labour	strikes	due	to	alleged	“national	security”	reasons.	With	the	new	 executive	 order	 of	 president	 Erdoğan,	 a	 public	 institution	 called	 Public	 Inspection	Committee	had	been	granted	the	right	 to	 investigate	and	fire	union	 leaders.	Hence,	workers	 in	Turkey	currently	have	a	limited	capacity	to	react	against	their	deteriorating	living	conditions.		
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Another	issue	that	relates	to	class	conflict	in	Turkey	is	the	fiscal	policy	during	the	crisis.	Business	circles	including	the	Turkish	Industry	and	Business	Association	(TÜSİAD)	and	Union	of	Chambers	 and	 Commodity	 Exchanges	 of	 Turkey	 (TOBB)	 have	 long	 been	 calling	 for	 austerity	measures	against	the	crisis.	Finance	Minister	Berat	Albayrak	responded	to	these	calls	by	saying	“Turkey	will	not	compromise	on	fiscal	discipline	and	reducing	inflation	is	a	top	priority”.	Of	course,	the	content	of	the	‘fiscal	discipline’	is	the	main	issue	here.	Austerity	measures	might	mean	taxing	top	1%	and	increasing	the	taxes	on	wealth	and	luxury	goods	or	it	might	mean	cutting	the	social	expenditures,	 reducing	 pensions	 and	 increasing	 taxes	 on	 wage	 goods.	 So	 far,	 the	 Erdoğan	government	implemented	austerity	measures	through	cutting	public	education	expenditures	by	around	$330	million.			In	summary,	the	economic	crisis	 in	Turkey	is	not	merely	an	outcome	of	a	political	crisis	instigated	by	Donald	Trump.	Turkey	is	now	paying	for	the	years	of	finance-led	growth	supported	by	 speculative	 financial	 capital	 inflows,	 and	 a	 construction	 boom.	With	 existing	 fragilities	 the	crisis	 in	Turkey	 is	 likely	 to	deepen.	 	Hence,	 the	 following	months	are	 likely	 to	be	hard	 for	 the	Turkish	economy	and	the	working	people	in	Turkey.															
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